In downstream markets where entry is independent from profitability conditions, the upstream supplier's optimal pricing policy is invariant with respect to downstream market structure. This price invariant result, however, is reversed when there is free entry in downstream market. When entry is endogenously dependent on profitability conditions, the upstream supplier's price-setting behavior depends on the number of operative firms in the final good market. We show that the upstream supplier charges a higher input price under a free entry situation in downstream market than under a no-entry condition. We also show that a higher input price is set under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition in a downstream market with free entry.
Introduction
A branch of literature that has received considerable attention examines the upstream supplier's optimal pricing policy with respect to downstream market competition. Greenhut and Ohta (1976) and Tyagi (1999) concluded that the pricesetting behavior of an upstream input supplier does not depend on the number of downstream firms for the constant elasticity of slope demand function.
1 Both papers consider the case of an exogenous market structure.
In this paper, we show that this price invariance result is reversed when there is free entry in the downstream market. We consider the case where products are differentiated and demand structure is linear.
In this setup, the upstream input price (wholesale price) is sensitive to downstream market competition, and more specifically it depends on the number of operative firms (retailers) in the final good market. Hence, free entry condition in downstream market affects the upstream monopolist's optimal pricing policy and the price invariance result is no longer valid.
If the upstream supplier moves first by setting the price of an intermediate good anticipating free entry in the downstream market, she will use her first mover advantage in order to influence the degree of competition for the market. This effect cannot be present in models which consider a fixed number of downstream firms, and therefore the upstream monopolist can only influence the intensity of competition in the market.
In a no-entry situation, the number of firms enters as a multiplicative factor, both for the downstream firm's profit and for the total revenue of the upstream monopolist.
The neutrality result follows. In the case of free entry, however, the number of firms depends on the level of profit of downstream firms generated. Hence, with a higher input price, there is the previous effect (influencing competition in the market), and another one through the number of firms given the presence of elasticity of the number of firms with respect to the input price.
1 Consider a homogenous-good market with inverse demand function ( ) p Q , where Q is the industry output and ( ) 0 p Q ′ < when ( ) 0 p Q > . The elasticity of slope of inverse demand function is ( ) ( ) p Q Q p Q ′′ ′ . See Tyagi (1999) for a detailed discussion and a list of specific demand functions that exhibit constant elasticity of slope.
The effect through the number of firms is always negative; by lowering the price of the input the upstream monopolist induces more entry. Consequently, a lower input price is set under a free entry situation in downstream market than under a no-entry condition.
The above conclusions for the upstream monopolist's input supply price under free entry hold for both quantity and price setting behavior of downstream firms. For the Cournot case a full analytical proof is provided, while for the Bertrand case extensive numerical analysis is used.
Numerical analysis is also used to determine whether under free entry, the upstream monopolist charges a higher input price under quantity or price competition in the downstream market. When products become more substitutable, the upstream monopolist finds the distortion on total quantity under price setting behavior of downstream rivals less important than under quantity setting behavior. Therefore, a higher input price is set under free entry Bertrand competition than under free entry Cournot competition. Cellini et al. (2004) and Mukherjee (2005) carry out comparative welfare evaluations between price and quantity competition on oligopolistic markets with free entry. These contributions point out that, with an endogenous market structure, welfare is higher under Bertrand competition when products are close substitutes, and it is higher under Cournot competition for sufficiently differentiated products. We show that these standard welfare conclusions emerge if retailers buy inputs from an independent upstream supplier. Haring & Kaserman (1978) and Greenhut & Ohta (1978) show that, for a given number of firms, the price invariance result does not hold when increasing marginal costs are considered. Koulamas and Kyparisis (2009) consider the effects of entry on downstream operational efficiency and demonstrate that the wholesaler's pricing policy is affected when pre-entry and post-entry retailer's variable costs differ. Our analysis extends this literature by showing that the price invariant result does not hold when free entry is taken into account, even if constant marginal costs are assumed and the effects of entry on downstream operational efficiency are ignored. Moreover, none of these studies consider retail price competition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the key elements of the baseline model. Section 3 briefly discusses the case where the number of downstream rivals is fixed. Section 4 considers both Cournot and Bertrand free entry downstream equilibrium and provides the results. The final section concludes.
The Baseline Model
Consider an economy with two final goods, X and M; the latter is a homogeneous numeraire good produced by a competitive sector while product X is sold in an imperfectly competitive market. Assume an upstream monopolist, which is the Let m be the quantity of the outside good which is assumed to be produced at a constant marginal cost equal to 1, and that its competitive price is 1. The utility function is additively separable in m and therefore there are no income effects on the monopolistic sector; this enables us to perform partial equilibrium analysis. Following Bowley (1924) , consumer preferences are represented by a utility function of the general form:
The simplifying assumption that the slope parameter ( ) b is equal to 1 is adopted.
Consumer demand for the retail product of firm i is given by the inverse demand function:
where i p is the price of firm i's product, , i jare the outputs of firm i and j respectively ( , 1,2... ,
, and a is a strictly positive constant. The parameter
shows the degree of product differentiation. As θ approaches 0, the products of retail rivals become independent. As θ approaches 1, the products of firms become closer substitutes. In the extreme case of 1 θ = products are completely homogeneous.
The equilibrium outcomes are derived using backward induction. First, the firms' decision variables under different forms of retail competition are determined, and then the upstream monopolist maximizes its profits, subject to the equilibrium demand for its output under each form of retail competition. The types of retail competition examined are Cournot oligopoly, Bertrand oligopoly and oligopoly with free entry, i.e., the number of downstream firms, under quantity and price setting behavior, is determined by the zero profit condition.
Fixed number of downstream firms
Initially, the case where the number of firms is exogenously determined is briefly discussed. There is prevention of new entry and the number of retailers is fixed at n n = . Under quantity competition, firms act simultaneously and choose output levels independently. The Cournot market equilibrium is derived straightforwardly when profits are non-negative:
In the Bertrand model, firms simultaneously set prices rather than output. By inverting equation (2), we obtain the demand function implied by the Bowley model:
which is valid provided that 1 θ < .
3 Standard analysis yields the following Bertrand market equilibrium:
Eqs. (3) to (7) are in line with Cellini et al. (2004) , Mukherjee (2005) and Koh (2008) .
Under vertical separation, the independent upstream supplier sets profit maximizing input prices. With an exogenous market structure, she will charge an input price independently of the number of downstream firms and/or the type of competition, as Proposition 1 states (See Appendix A for proof). A hat is used to denote the input price when the number of retailers is fixed. Singh & Vives (1984) , considering a duopoly setting and assuming that firms have constant yet different marginal costs, show that consumer and total surplus are always higher in the Bertrand equilibrium while firms profits are higher in the Cournot equilibrium when goods are substitutes. By imposing more symmetry, Koh (2008) shows that duopoly welfare results generalize to the n-firm setting. 4 Proposition 1 implies that the cost structure of retail providers is not affected by the form of retail competition. Therefore, the welfare conclusions, initially proposed by Singh & Vives (1984) and later generalized by Koh (2008) , prevail even if retail competitors buy inputs from an upstream monopolist.
Free entry downstream equilibrium
In this section, we turn to the case where the number of firms in the downstream market is endogenously determined. The number of retailers is considered to be continuous, suggesting a zero profit condition. We shall consider both Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Cournot downstream competition
In a quantity setting behavior, the zero profit condition is expressed by
for which the long run equilibrium number of firms is obtained as
Equation (14) implies that the profit maximizing input price depends on the degree of product substitutability θ and the fixed set-up cost f, and therefore it is related to the number of retailers. Thus, the result of the supplier's optimal pricing policy being invariant to downstream market structure is reversed if free entry is taken into account, as the next Proposition indicates.
Proposition 2. Under Cournot competition in a downstream market with free entry,
the optimal input price the upstream supplier sets is sensitive to downstream market structure, and it depends on the number of operative firms.
In models which consider a fixed number of downstream firms, the upstream monopolist can only influence the intensity of competition in the market. The number of firms enters as a multiplicative factor, both for the downstream firm's profit and for the total revenue of the upstream monopolist. The neutrality result follows.
In the case of free entry, however, the upstream supplier not only can influence the intensity of competition in the market but also can influence the degree of competition in the downstream market, that is competition for the market. The number of firms depends on the level of profit of downstream firms generated. Hence, with a higher input price, there is the previous effect (influencing competition in the market), but there is another effect through the number of firms since there is now elasticity of the number of firms with respect to the input price.
The free entry equilibrium depends on the level of fixed costs and the degree of differentiation, and therefore the profit maximizing input price will also depend on these variables. Comparative statics show that the optimal input price the upstream supplier sets i) decreases with fixed set-up costs and ii) increases as products become more substitutes.
It is obvious from Eq. (14) that the higher is f the lower is the optimal input price the upstream monopolist sets, for any given degree of product differentiation. When the downstream market is very concentrated, the benefits from increasing competition are important. As fixed cost f increases, the monopolist finds the distortion on total quantity more important and thus charges a lower input price.
Moreover, the higher is θ the higher is the optimal input price the upstream monopolist sets, for any given fixed cost f. For any given market concentration ( ) n ∀ , firm's conduct becomes more competitive as products become more substitutes. Thus, in turn, makes it less urgent for the upstream monopolist to increase competition through a lower input price and a larger number of downstream firms.
The independent upstream supplier sets a lower input price under a free entry situation in downstream market than under a no-entry condition, as proposition 3
states (See Appendix B for proof). Recall that a tilde is used to denote the input price charged by the upstream monopolist under free entry and a hat to denote the input price when the number of retailers is fixed. The only case where the two prices coincide is when f approaches zero. For a given number of firms, the upstream monopolist cannot affect downstream market structure by changing the input price she sets. Under free entry, however, there is elasticity of the number of firms with respect to input price. This elasticity is always negative; a higher input price implies higher marginal cost for each retailer, and thus fewer firms in equilibrium. By lowering the price of the input the upstream supplier induces more entry.
Bertrand downstream competition
In a price setting behavior the zero profit condition is expressed by
It is assumed that the following condition holds throughout the analysis
which ensures that at least one firm enters the market under free entry equilibrium. 
However, since Eq. (15) is a polynomial equation of third degree in the variable n with all its coefficients being non numeric, the exact formula for the equilibrium number of firms is too complex. Consequently, the exact formula for the profit maximizing input price b d is extremely difficult to be derived. In order to be able to determine whether the profit maximizing input price depends on the number of retailers or not, we proceed by using numerical examples.
In the calculations, the values of the parameters a, θ and f vary. In Table I , The calculations reported in Table I show that Proposition 2 remains valid even for Bertrand retail competition. The profit maximizing input price charged under price setting behavior of downstream rivals depends on the fixed cost f and the degree of product differentiation θ, and thus it is related to the number of retailers. 5 Moreover, the independent upstream supplier sets a lower input price when the number of downstream firms is endogenously determined compared to the exogenous case.
(Place Table I _ approximately here)
Comparison between Cournot and Bertrand downstream competition
The calculations reported in Table I − . In Table I , for very small θ (see Groups 8 and 9), the prices charged under Cournot and Bertrand free entry equilibrium are almost equal. In the extreme case of totally independent products ( 0) θ = , the prices charged under the two regimes are equal, i.e.,
6 As products become more substitutable, the upstream monopolist finds the distortion on total quantity under price setting behavior of downstream rivals less important than under quantity setting behavior.
Second, the equilibrium number of downstream firms competing in prices ( ) b n is not larger than the equilibrium number of downstream firms competing in
n . Under free entry, holding the cost structure of retail rivals constant, the long-run equilibrium number of firms will be larger under quantity setting than under price setting behavior (Cellini et al, 2004; Mukherjee 2005) . Since the upstream supplier charges a higher input price under retail price competition, the marginal cost of a retailer competing in prices will be higher than the marginal cost of the same retailer competing in quantities. Therefore, Bertrand firms are still fewer in equilibrium.
7 Cellini et al. (2004) and Mukherjee (2005) investigate the welfare properties of the entry process in oligopolistic markets. They find that Bertrand competition yield a higher welfare than Cournot competition if products are close substitutes and a lower 6 The equilibrium input price and the equilibrium number of downstream competitors must satisfy the zero profit condition. Substituting , d n into expressions (8) and (15) respectively, and combining these expressions together we obtain:
It is easy to verify that for 0 θ = , the above equation holds for welfare if products are sufficiently differentiated. We show that these welfare conclusions are not altered if retail competitors buy inputs from an upstream supplier.
Ignoring the integer constraint on number of firms implies that the net profit of all downstream firms is zero in the free entry equilibrium. Therefore, total welfare is equal to consumer surplus, which is given by
All subsequent equations base on Mukherjee (2005) . The optimal output under Cournot competition is given by Eq. (12). From Eqs. (6) and (15) 
Consumer surplus under Cournot and Bertrand competition is respectively
From Eqs. (19) and (20) (1 ( 1))(
For θ=1 the LHS of (21) is less than RHS. Expression (21) becomes n n ≥ (see Table I ).
Welfare is higher under Bertrand competition if products are close substitutes and it is higher under Cournot competition for sufficiently differentiated products.
Therefore, the standard welfare conclusions emerge if retailers buy inputs from an independent upstream supplier.
Conclusions
We considered the case of an upstream monopolist producing the intermediate input and an imperfectly competitive downstream stage, with retailers producing the final differentiated good. Our model showed that the result of the supplier's optimal pricing policy being invariant to downstream market structure is reversed when there is free entry. The upstream input price is sensitive to downstream market competition, and more specifically it depends on the number of downstream firms. Free entry condition in downstream market affects optimal upstream pricing and the price invariance result obtained under no-entry condition no longer holds.
We showed that the upstream supplier charges a lower input price when the number of downstream firms is endogenously determined (free entry) compared to the case when the latter is determined exogenously (no-entry condition), for both quantity and price retail competition. We also showed that a higher input price is set under 
ii.) Bertrand competition
When firms compete in prices, the profit function of firm i can be expressed as 
